INDONESIA:
A COUNTRY IN TRANSITION[1]
A POSSIBLE
CONTEXT FOR THE BOMBING TRAGEDY IN BALI[2]
James Veitch
Associate
Professor of Religious Studies
Victoria University of Wellington
Indonesia is an extraordinary country[3].
It constitutes a vast archipelago of 13,677 islands, stretching more than 3,500
kilometres from Aceh (the ‘veranda of Islam’) in the west, to Jayapura (West
Papua/Irian Jaya) in the east, from the Philippines in the north, to Australia
in the south. It boasts some five hundred different languages, and more than
three hundred different groups or socio-linguistic groupings each with a
distinctive culture and oral history.[4]
The country stretches across the world linking South East Asia with the pacific
islands of Melanesia and is the fourth most populous country. The islands of
Java and of Bali are amongst the most intensively populated areas of anywhere
in the world. There are heavily populated cities like Jakarta and Yogyakarta
but there are also sparsely populated areas in Kalimantan and West Papua. The
ethnic, cultural, social, economic, and political diversity of the people who
make up the population of this country is immense.
Today Indonesia is home to approximately 233 million people. In less than fifty years from now-some believe it is more likely to be thirty years- the population will be in the vacinity of 330 million. Indonesia will have then as it has now the largest Muslim population in the world.
However the nation’s motto betrays its Achilles heel. Unity in diversity was the dream of the
founders of the modern state but Aceh has little in common with East Timor
apart from a desire to be independent of Indonesia. The West Papuans have
little in common with the Javanese, and people from Flores have little in
common with the islanders of Nias. Not many people who live in villages of
inland Kalimantan have heard of those who live on Lombok or on Sumba. Although
Indonesians are keen travelers not many are in a financial position to take a
vacation and visit other parts of their own country on a sight seeing trip. If
they travel outside of searching for a job or in connection with business it is
likely to be over family matters. Most cannot afford it to be otherwise.
Geographical distance and large areas of sea separating the islands provide
substantial barriers to communication and the understanding of identity and
nationhood.
In fact the unifying factor apart from the country motto and the
standard emblems of statehood-the flag and the national song- is the Indonesian
language that all must speak in order to communicate with each other across the
barriers and the diversity. But even then only about twenty percent speak
Indonesian in the home and fewer speak it as their primary language. For many
young people the first encounter they have with their own country and a
national identity is when they start school and learn Indonesian. Culture
divides and tribalism destroys any possibility of unity across social units.
Even with a common language to try and bridge the worlds of difference that
exist, diversity runs through communities like the edge of a jagged saw.
Indonesia as a concept was created by the stroke of pen when Britain
and the Netherlands governments signed the treaty of London on March 17 1824.
Indonesia was known then as the Netherlands East Indies. The signatures brought
to an end three hundred years of rivalry between these two maritime powers over
who should control the then lucrative spice trade[5].
But the tenacity of the Dutch had also seen off the Portuguese and the Spanish
who had dominated trade in the area in the sixteenth century. In the treaty of
London the Dutch saw the British off to the safety of the island of Singapore
and to what we today call Malaysia and Brunei.
The Acehnese put in a plea, at the time for independence and although it was grudgingly acknowledged and written into the treaty, the Dutch chose to ignore it. It took them until 1908 to gain a toehold in the territory at the tip of Sumatra.[6] The Indonesian successors to the Dutch have taken until December 2002 to reach an accommodation with Aceh. Since the treaty of London it has been a violent and costly struggle for the Acehenese, first against the Dutch and then against the Indonesian army. The Dutch and the Indonesians also paid a price, although the Dutch were shrewd enough to use Indonesians as surrogate warriors to fight their battles during colonial times. But for all these struggles even now the autonomy the Achenese have been awarded is far short of the independence they were guaranteed a hundred and fifty years ago.[7]
It is not only the Acehnese who have lived with violence. The Papuans
of Irian Jaya or West Papua, as it is now called, have had a similar experience
even though, by comparison, it is of a much shorter duration. Other parts of
Indonesia have been similarly affected. There has been, since independence, a
pro-Dutch party in Ambon: in recent years it has been blamed for part of the
violence that has ruined the lives of many in the south Moluccas. East Timor’s
twenty five- years of struggle for independence from Indonesia is coloured by a
depth of violence that has left people traumatized and dysfunctional.
Violence, so it seems, has always characterized the lives of the people
who live in these islands. The Makassarese of South Sulawesi for example fought
for local rulers as mercenaries in every part of pre-colonial South East Asia:
they were famous for their fighting spirit, their courage and loyalties and for
their explosive tempers. That was when the islands were part of an Indian
empire.[8]
When Islam crept along the spine of the islands the Makassarese embraced the
new faith: it fitted like a glove the character of this tribal people[9].
Their neighbours, the Buginese, have also been a distinguished people but like
the Makasarese heavily involved in the conflicts of South East Asia..[10]
Why violence has been a way of life in these islands of Indonesia-from
pre-colonial times, during the Dutch period and since independence- is an
unresolved mystery that has begun to engage academic minds.[11]
A recent conference identified some of the issues and the main papers presented
for discussion have been published. The matter of violence in Indonesia is now
in the international arena. One of the contributors put the issue succinctly. Indonesia is a violent country…(It) violence
is more than a succession of random eruptions, each horrifying and unique.
There is a systemic side to it. Violence is ingrained in recurring patterns,
which makes it more frightening.[12]
Violence has undermined and destroyed the unity that successive
governments, colonial and post- colonial have sought. But paradoxically none
have sought to actually use violence to maintain unity with as much
sophistication than former President Soeharto.[13]
Ruling through the army, the security services, and the police he maintained a
vice- like grip on the country. It was his fall from power in May 1998 that
heralded an unprecedented period of explosive change in Indonesia.[14]
He his family and close associates had ruled through fear. As a family they lived well as did those who benefited from the family’s pre-eminence over all facets of the nation’s life. It was a tightly controlled dictatorship. When the end came it exposed the depth of patronage (and of sophisticated corruption) that had been enjoyed by many of the Indonesian upper class.
It was the wealth accumulated by President Habibbie that amongst other things sent him into exile in Europe-though it is doubtful he would have survived as President for Habibbie was an outsider from South Sulawesi. It is difficult for anyone outside of Java to lead Indonesia at the present time. But the end of the Soeharto era also left a giant sized political vacuum that has proved difficult to fill.
President Wahid, Habibbie’s successor, came into office on a crest of
support. He was regarded as a moderate Muslim figure who could command the
respect of the people.[15]
But he found the task overwhelming and took himself off on extensive overseas
tours leaving the day to day task of governing to those he left behind. The
economic situation that had brought about Soeharto’s demise continued to worsen
and undermined Wahid’s credibility. [16]
His successor the then Vice President, Megawati Sukarnoputri[17],
inherited a near impossible situation. Her Indonesia is divided by ethnic
conflict as Indonesian opposes Indonesian in a region like Aceh, as Indonesian
opposes Papuan in West Papua, as Chinese oppose Indonesian in a place like
Lombok. Her Indonesia is divided by religious differences as Muslim clash with
Christian in Central Sulawesi, in Ambon and Halmahera. Though the country
struggles with high inflation and economic depression it is rich with natural
resources and has abundant sources of food. Political rivalries with opposing
agendas constantly undermine stability as Indonesia struggles to create a
workable version of democracy both centrally and in the provinces. Military
commanders and provincial governors often operate with a striking degree of
autonomy that neutralizes the influence and authority of the central
administration.[18]
The bomb blast in Bali on October 12 shattered Megawati’s fragile grip
on leadership as Indonesia found itself under the glaring blaze of the
international spotlight.
It has been difficult for western scholars and observers to determine
the extent of the influence of religion in Indonesia and its influence on
decision making. So let me sketch an outline that I think will provide at least
a provisional framework for understanding how religion empowers politics, and
influences the political processes in the country.
Indonesians believe that their lives are played out in the context of a greater and more important invisible world. Deities who it is believed intervene to shape the direction of human history dominate this world. At a basic level these deities lead a complex hierarchy of spirits, good and bad that mimic the complexity of human relationships. Just as humans fall out with each other for a variety of reasons so do the spirits, indeed so do the gods. But this invisible world includes and transcends the everyday world of all Indonesians.
Every day they, individually and collectively, experience the intervention
of the gods and the spirits who do the bidding of the deities. Spirits are
associated with mountains and rivers and every aspect of the empirical world so
the human world is spiritually alive and impregnated with a sense of the
sacred. This is the reason Hindu Balinese place flower offerings in the gateway
or doorway before dawn; why travelers, farmers, hunters, fishermen and women
make offerings before setting out; and it is the reason for Muslims to respond
to the call to prayer five times a day.
This primal religious world, where the divine and the human meet was
reinterpreted by the strands of Hinduism and Buddhism that made their way to
Indonesia in the time of the great Indian empire. This empire, from the second
through to the fourteenth centuries of the common era, permeated Asia to the
tips of Indonesia.[19]
Borobudor and Prambanan, thirty kilometres from Yogyakarta, are
beautiful and stunning monuments to the influence of both traditions. They were
built from local stone between the sixth and the eighth centuries and testify
to the wealth of the people, and to the tranquility of the times that provided
the leisure for meditation and ceremony. The engineering skills required for
the buildings and the craftsmanship detailed in the carvings on the stone point
to an advanced level of achievement. There are other monuments to the
religiousness of the period in other parts of Java but there is nothing
comparable to Borobudor and Prambanan.[20]
Muslim traders began to introduce their religion into Indonesia from
the sixth century but Islamisation did not begin until the thirteenth century
when the ruler of Aceh converted to the new faith. The progress of Islamization
was slow particularly amongst the peoples of Sumatra and Java as Islam was
absorbed into the Indianized primal religion that had already transformed the
peoples of these two islands.
By the time the Dutch began to expand their influence in the
seventeenth century they encountered a Muslim Indonesia. Hinduism had been
pushed from Java to Bali where it began to transform primal beliefs into the
temple structures, ritual, ceremony and dance[21]
that can be encountered today especially in village life.
Sometime during this four hundred-year period changes in religious
orientation brought alterations in levels of tolerance and accommodation. Where
the Indianization was weakest the primal worldview was easily absorbed into
Islam and the resultant Islam lost its sharp edge and became benign. Where it
was strong there were competing religious claims and a struggle ensued with
Islam more often than not emerging victorious.
Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant arrived with the European
traders. Christianity was Protestantism. In keeping with what happened
elsewhere in Asia, Catholic Christianity came to be regarded as another
religion in its own right.[22]
Christianity received a boost in prestige following the beginning of
the Dutch colonial period. In the course of time many of the Indonesians who
were employed in the colonial civil service became Christians and influenced
their extended families into joining the church. This connection was the
primary reason that the church in Indonesia appeared to the Muslim majority to
retain its western links and privileges following independence.
There is some force to the argument. Protestant Christianity sought to
destroy the primal world- view and replace it with a secularized understanding
of the transcendent. Gone was the world of departmental gods and the activities
of spirits good and bad. Gone too was the community of the living dead that
invisibly linked the seen and the unseen dimensions of the world known to
humans.
This world was replaced with the transcendent theistic and creator God,
with Jesus the mediator between humans and this God, and with Satan the
personification of all the forces that work to oppose God and the work of Jesus
in reconciling humans to their God. Death marked a stark boundary line between
the living, and the dead who were in the presence of God and unable to assist
the living in any way.[23]
Protestant Christianity appeared to drive a wedge between the existing and
pervasive spirituality of the Indonesian islands and force believers to belong
to a new and different community that was non-Indonesian. Christians, European
and Indonesian, became outsiders.[24]Protestant
Christianity was the secularising arm of western Colonialism. This left a
distinctive cultural and religious void in tribal groups and alienated
Christians from others in their ethnic communities, families, and wider kin
groups.
Islam a near relative religiously speaking of Christianity did not make
the same mistake but adopted and then adapted the primal world view in
Indonesia in much the same way that it had done elsewhere. Protestant
Christianity offered an either or choice with primal religion and the
advantages of westernization. Where links were made with the civil
administration some tribal areas identified with Christianity.[25]
In the heavily populated areas with a long history of primal religion mixed
into Hinduism and then Islam Christianity made little headway.[26]
When Indonesia became independent and later when the connection between the Dutch and Irian Jaya was broken, the Indonesians most affected by three hundred years of colonial administration-the Ambonese and the Menadonese-found themselves western orphans in an increasingly alien environment. As Indonesians since independence, have sought to find and to establish an identity, the Christian and western influences have become increasingly suspect.
The fault lies with the (perceived) unIndonesian character of
Christianity and the Church. It destroyed the primal world- view and therefore
the cultural base of Indonesian ethnic communities, and then became identified
with (western) Dutch administration policies that challenged and destroyed the
cultural and social structure of these communities.[27]
The imposition by the Dutch of a different system of education, justice, law
and commerce whose foundations were often said to lie with Christianity,
introduced radical change that was perceived to threaten and destroy the
integrity of the Indonesian. The introduction of forms of local autonomy that
gave some Indonesians administrative and political power over other Indonesians
(though under Dutch and therefore Western supervision) gave Indonesians the
first taste of democracy.[28]
In the face of such traumatic cultural dislocation they sought refuge and
protection in the cloak of Islam.
At that point the die was cast ensuring a clash of civilisation between
Indonesia and the West on the one hand and between Indonesian Muslim and
Indonesian Christian on the other. This observation can be put in another way.
The Dutch[29] misread the
power and influence of religion. In this case it was the primal-world view and
Islam that they did not understand but thought could be displaced or at the
very least sidelined in favour of the benefits of western civilisation. They
believed that economics and not religion provided the framework for development
and that it was possible to change Indonesia and in so doing introduce the
practical benefits of the enlightenment that had been achieved in Europe.
In seeking to bring about such a primary degree of change the Dutch
unwittingly intensified the level of violence already inherent in Indonesian
communities. In so doing they destroyed indigenous
political autonomy by appropriating the
culture and minds of the colonized. This was done by military means on the bodies of thousands of victims.[30]
When power was handed over to Indonesians, Sukarno, the first
President, stepped directly into Dutch administration shoes. With the guidance
of Dutch advisors from the previous administration he put a hold on further
attempts to democratise. He believed that
Indonesian culture and Western democracy [were] not compatible.[31]In
the 1950s with the help of Indonesian advisors he built up strong central
(Javanese) government. The people were told that this was guided democracy, a
superior form of democracy, tailor-made for Asia by Asians.
Soeharto who came to power at the end of September 1965 continued to
build a strong central government. But without the pretence of guided
democracy. However in taking power he destroyed the remnants of indigenous political autonomy and
appropriated the culture and minds of the people in a military operation that
cost thousands of victims.
The Soeharto administration was founded on a bloody revolution[32]
that claimed between 500,00 and a million lives.[33]
According to one writer these mass
killings of alleged members of
the Indonesian Communist Party and their sympathisers belongs to the worst counter-revolutionary acts of violence in the
twentieth century.[34]
Worst affected was Bali. There
between December 1965 and early 1966 an estimated 80,000 people-or roughly 5
percent of the population of under 2 million- were shot, knifed, hacked or
clubbed to death.[35]It
was an angry outpouring of grief and of vengeance camouflaged and empowered by
religion-in this case the religion of Hindu Bali. On the one hand the Balinese
tried to atone for the failed coup and the connections of communism with the
communalism of Balinese society an understandable but flawed connection.[36]
On the other hand old scores left smouldering for decades were settled. Stories
of the killings make for chilling reading.[37]It
was a dark hour for the Balinese. Most families in the Denpasar region were
affected and the whole Balinese community took decades to recover from the
trauma.[38]
Wherever the killings occurred these mass murders were interpreted as
acts of ritual cleansing undertaken
by the state with the knowledge and tacit support of Western Governments and
Indonesia’s neighbours.[39]
Having begun with such a flourish and having to cover up the reasons
behind the coup by muddying the political water[40]Soeharto
was left with no choice but to institutionalise further acts of violence and to
continue in the way that he had begun.
When the Soeharto era came to an end after months of protest and
economic bad news in 1998 it closed one of the most repressive periods of
Government in Indonesian history. For the first time people could speak out
publicly without fear and the media could report criticism of the Government.
The University campus became the forum for political debate and a middle class
stepped out with renewed confidence in the cities: this middle class is young,
educated, vibrant, socially and economically mobile and westward looking. It is
however cynical of the Government and disillusioned by the recent events in
Indonesia’s political history. As if by way of compensation it spends and lives
well with a modern westernised secular lifestyle.[41]
With the fall of Soeharto people had the opportunity to openly declare themselves politically and religiously. Options emerged. This was a new experience. Freedoms had to be tested and boundaries pushed to the limit. But there were limitations as politicians, the military, the security services and the police and the judiciary grappled with the new situation.
When Soeharto stepped down Indonesia was thrust into a period of
uncertainty and transition. The vote for the independence of East Timor the
following year deeply shocked the administration, angered the military and
bewildered the nation. The anger was in part turned on Australia. To understand
some of the reasons for this we need to recall the problems surrounding the
independence and subsequent story of the relationship of this area with
Indonesia.
When East Timor had become part of Indonesia it ended colonialism as
the last remaining outpost of South East Asia was absorbed. The West including
Australia and New Zealand supported the integration of East Timor into
Indonesia.[42] However,
the end of colonialism came with violence that was largely ‘sanctioned’ by the
west and by Indonesia’s Asean neighbours.[43]
The United States also offered its support to the Indonesian occupation
of Timor. The actual invasion was postponed until 7 December 1975 to allow
President Ford and Henry Kissinger to visit Jakarta the previous day. During
meetings with Soeharto the visitors were well briefed on the events about to
unfold in twelve hours. It became clear following this meeting that there would
be no support for the principle of self- determination.[44]It
took three years for the Indonesian army to gain control but even then the
control was challenged and threatened by resistance forces. During those three
years it is thought that at least 120,000
East Timorese died. By the early 80s the widely accepted estimate of the death
toll since invasion was 200,000…almost one-third of the pre-invasion
population.[45]
By the late 80s Australia’s attention had turned towards the implications of joint oil explorations with Indonesia under the Timor Gap treaty.[46]
But that support was slowly eroded over the next twenty- five years
largely due to continued human rights abuses and to the consistent lobbying of
Western nations by the East Timorese Government in exile. This lobbying
received an impetus from international attention following the Dili massacre in
which two hundred died on 12 November 1991. The violence unleashed by the
Indonesian military began to stir the conscience of western governments.[47]
Hababie, Soeharto’s chosen successor unilaterally decided on the
referendum that changed East Timor’s future. The withdrawal of Indonesia from
East Timor was a bloody affair but this time the West including Australia did
not side with Indonesia.
Australia’s leading role in these subsequent events served to highlight
the sharp differences between the two neighbours, a relationship tinged with
fragility since Indonesia’s independence. The loss of face of the Indonesian
military ran deep and the anger turned towards Australia.
Running parallel to the events in East Timor was the continuing
political instability in Jakarta and the fluctuating fortunes of the economy.
Fresh parliamentary elections were held in June 1999 with the party led
by Megawati Sukarnoputri gaining the largest number of seats followed by the
party of National Awakening led by Abdurrahman Wahid. The Golkar party of
Soeharto and Habibie was a distant third. Without support in the new parliament
Habibie withdrew from the presidential race.[48]
Wahid who represented the more centralist Muslim party was elected with
Megawati as his Vice-President in October 1999. When Wahid’s administration was
unable to control inflation and produce a period of stability, Megawati and
Hamza Haz replaced him in July 2001.This leadership brought together into an
uneasy coalition the traditional political stream and the nationalists, along
with activist Muslim parties.
Hamza Haz is the leader of a coalition of smallish Muslim parties whose
membership wishes to see a more active commitment to Islam in the country by
the politicians. He also has the support of the centralist [49]Muslim
movement that had given Wahid his power base. Many of these parties and their
sympathisers had been forced underground during the Soeharto years. In this
transition period they emerged and were joined by a number of new parties.
An estimated eighty-eight percent of Indonesians-205 million people-are
either active or nominal Muslims. The largest of the groups-Nahdlatul Ulama,
the one that supported and provided Wahid with his power- has an estimated membership
of thirty million: approximately 15% of the Muslim population base in the
country. This leaves room for a wide diversity of other Muslim interests and
influences and these vary from those who favour the strict application of the
shariah to those who believe it is Muslims alone who need to abide by the codes
defined in Muslim law.
It is not known how widespread a secular strand may be. According to
the five principles of the constitution (pancasila) every one is required to
hold a religious faith. But this requirement in itself would not preclude a
person being personally a nominal Muslim acknowledging a cultural and social
identity connected with Islam but being inactive religiously.
Most Muslim Indonesians however appear to connect being Indonesian with
being Muslim so that any threat against one become a threat against the other.
In times of stress and conflict the commitment to Islam becomes more prominent.
Some Muslim Indonesians have an opportunity to make the pilgrimage to
Makkah. A certain number selected from across Indonesia are subsidised by the
Government and make the journey each year in fulfilment of one of the pillars
on which their faith is based. Those selected from villages enjoy considerable
prestige when they return and are the centre of attention for some time. They
have an important story to tell and each step of the journey is re counted in
great detail. In this way the experience of participation in the ceremonies at
the holy places of Makkah is passed on to others.
Locally based Islam is internationalised through pilgrimage and village
communities across the nation have an opportunity to renew their Muslim roots.
In towns and cities the influence may be more diffuse but the continuous
connection with Makkah and the experience of sharing with other Muslims from
around the world in this way reinvigorates the faith of others in the family
and community.
The 1979 Iranian revolution led by the Ayatollah Khomeini made a considerable
impact on Indonesian Muslims.[51]
It was an impact sheared by young Muslims through the world. That revolution
had been a decade in the making. Slowly though the nineties the Shah of Iran
had been undermined by strong and virulent religious stirrings and
underpinnings. The West had been lulled into thinking the Shah could deal with
the problem and the economic advantages of his reforms would win support from
enough people to contain the influence of the clerics.
This was not to be the case. The Shah was deposed in a wave of
religious fervour and a new clerical leadership came to power in the midst of a
radical social revolution. The shock waves were felt beyond the Persian Gulf
and the Middle East and has had ever since far-reaching but different consequences
for the West as well as the Muslim world. For the Muslim world the Iranian
revolution symbolised a coming of age of Islam as a religious and political
force.
The figure of Osama bin Laden has also begun to assume something of the
same kind of influence in the Muslim world and not surprisingly in Indonesia.
Even if he were to be captured and tried in the West or in an Muslim country
sympathetic to the west or in an international court and be found guilty of
charges connected with terrorism in the West it is probable that he would
retain this status.[52]
Ordinary Muslims greeted the revolution and the subsequent hostage
crisis with acclaim. This was the Muslim world through the figure of the
Ayatollah being led into a new stage of history and in the process of this
revitalisation of standing up to the West.
For the West this mean an urgent reconsideration of how the smooth flow
of oil from the Persian Gulf was to be protected and of forging new alliances
with other oil producing countries in the region. It meant putting a political
wedge between the leadership of Shi’ite Iran and the leadership of the greater
Sunni world, and of offering large economic and military advantages to the
latter for staying with the West. With the successful implementation of this
policy Iran was contained.
But for Muslims in the street the Shi’a and Sunni division was
overlooked. What was inspired leadership for the Shi’a community could also be
inspired leadership for the Sunni, for how that inspiration was worked out
could have different but positive political consequences.
Since the middle of the 1970s, Islam in all its strands and divisions
has been caught up in a widespread and wide-ranging revitalisation movement
that takes many forms. Because Islam does not make a distinction between
politics and faith, a distinction that we in the west have difficulty in
understanding,[53] the
revitalisation of faith can have and in some cases does have radical
consequences. In the twenty- first century these radical consequences are
labelled in the West fundamentalism and terrorism.
But the use of these words makes little or no sense to ordinary
Muslims. They think of the activism (back to Muslim basics) as something
springing out of this renewed sense of faith. The use of armed force in some
situations is a consequence of the need to protect this new sense of faith and
its application as a social blue print for family and state. This mixture (of
faith and its political application) has been bubbling away at the grass roots
in Muslim countries or wherever Muslims live, unnoticed for nearly thirty
years. Indonesian Muslims have been caught up in this revitalisation of faith.
In the continuing struggle between the Palestinians and Israel there is considerable sympathy and support for the former among Indonesians. In talking with friends and colleagues there the conversation often turned to the coming clash between The United States and Iraq. It was noted that Israel has bluntly refused to honour United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as Iraq but why should one be punished but not the other. If one is to be denied weapons of mass destruction why should the other be allowed to keep theirs? A failure to be even handed appears to give credence to the suspicion that the West is out to destroy Islam and to prevent Muslim States from being truly muslim.
Samuel P.Huntington’s major study [54] seemed to some of my Indonesian
friends to have become the rationalisation and the justification for current
Western policies in relation to Islam. The application of his argument to the
Palestine-Israel situation as well as to a
solution to a range of issues in the Middle East, and for the Muslim world
in general mad them nervous.[55]
Whatever be the influence of this book in actual policy formation might be the
point remains that the alliance between Israel and the United Sates gives rise,
at least in part, to the anti-American attitude of many Indonesians. Why is
America always on the side of the Jews and against Muslims, is a question that
is readily asked.
Alongside this question is the belief that the Australian Government
works hand in glove with the United States and the latter supports Australia’s
policy of intervention in Indonesia and other countries in South East Asia
(with the exception of Singapore). It seemed to be a given in conversations
that Australia is the surrogate for the United States in South East Asia and
acts as this surrogate through a combination of political, economic and
military manoeuvring.
This then is the background against which I want to speak about the
activist Muslim movements that have emerged since 1998.
They appear to me to be of two kinds, those that support a greater
sense of Muslim identity for Indonesia, and those that support a regional
Muslim identity for Indonesia and for the Islamic communities of South East
Asia. Both movements have in common strong anti-western sentiments.
The Islamic Defenders front has according to media sources several thousand members.
Its leaders insist that their cause is focused on the strict enforcement of Muslim sharia law. Hence the targeting of bars and night clubs in fashionable parts of Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Specifically they advocate a stricter enforcement of divorce law and punishment for adultery. They believe that all women should wear the headscarf in public and both male and female should dress with modesty. This group first emerged during the 1997 economic and financial crisis, but its main influence has been felt since Soeharto stepped down. In 2001 members threatened to attack Westerners in Indonesia in retaliation for United States bombing raids in Afghanistan. But the threats led to no known attack. The group’s leader Habib Rizieg Shihab is currently under house arrest on charges of inciting violence.
The Laskar Movement.
Laskar Jundullah formed by Agus Dwikarna, at present in prison in the
Philippines, has a close relationship with Jemaah Islamiyah in the region and
has been at the forefront of the conflict in Central Sulawesi. It also has
close relations with Laskar Jihad.
This group has been involved in the armed struggle in Ambon and
Halmahera as well as Sulawesi. It is reputed to have a core membership of about
three thousand though its founder Jafar Umar Thalib, currently detained on
charges of inciting religious violence,[57]
has said that he could raise the support of thousands more should the Muslim
identity of Indonesia be threatened.
Laskar Jihad or holy war is a
many sided movement. It has educational, health care and social strands in
addition to its para military wing. Its members have appeared in other troubled
areas of Indonesia notably West Papua and Aceh to offer support and solidarity
to fellow Muslims who share their concerns about the future of the Muslim
status of Indonesia. They were not welcomed in Aceh and stayed for a short time
only. This was also the case in West Papua.
The main thrust of their military interest has been Central Sulawesi[58]
and the Moluccas. Figures vary considerably, but as many as six thousand may
have been killed in Central Sulawesi over the last three years and perhaps as
high as nine thousand in the Moluccas during the same period. The clashes have
not been solely Christian against Muslim. In central Sulawesi there has been a
catholic group from Flores involved in the conflict against Protestants. The
leader of the Catholic group is in prison under sentence of death for his part
in the conflict. A Protestant leader is also in detention and one of the key
Protestant leaders at the forefront of ongoing attempts to bring reconciliation
between the warring parties died unexpectedly leaving a void in the search for
reconciliation. After peace agreements had been signed conflict continued but
on a much smaller basis than before.
The figures of the dead may be high. But there is no way of knowing
accurately how many have died. Life in the area has been chaotic. As many as
half a million may have been displaced and thousands rendered homeless as
villages from both sides have been burned in retaliation or as acts of revenge.
It may be a generation before the full implications of the conflict on human
life in the area may be settled.
In Ambon the clashes have involved Muslims against the Republican movement of the Moluccas that is Protestant based. The latter’s leaders are currently in prison. Although peace has been restored through signed agreements between the parties concerned and the Government, sporadic acts of violence have continued into 2003.
Through contacts I made in Indonesia and in conversation with those who
know the region well in Australia it seemed possible that the Philippine based
Abu Sayyaf has been involved in the fighting in central Sulawesi and in
Halmahera. This group may have been one of the main conduits for guns and
ammunition for all sides in the conflict.
Links with Laskar Jihad and Laskar Jundullah and through Jemaah
Islamiyah [59]with
elements of Al Qaeda have also been suggested.[60]
In fact it appears that certain groups loyal to Osama bin Laden have been
active in central Sulawesi and there have been reported sightings of foreigners
in the area where camps have been found. In a recent report Indonesian
intelligence sources have admitted that Al-Qaida
provided money, weapons and explosives training for volunteers at jungle camps
near Poso in Central Sulawesi province.[61]
Afghan Arabs have been identified and a number of Caucasians in the camps.
Although Thalib the founder of Laskar Jihad denies any links with Al Qaeda or
Osama bin Laden he did join the Afghan mujahideen in their struggle against the
Soviet Union and is known to have met bin Laden in Pakistan in 1987.
In May 2002 the Indonesian Vice President visited Thalib in prison.
Leaders of other Muslim organisations also paid visits. Thalib is an important
strategic figurehead uniting many of the activist Muslim groups.[62]
The first of the regional groups is Darul Islam(literally, the abode of
Islam).This movement originated towards the end of Dutch colonial rule and was
formed to promote the founding of an Islamic State in Indonesia. It has played
a prominent role in the past in rebellions in Aceh, West Java, and South
Sulawesi. Some of its leaders have nurtured a dream of bringing all the Muslim
people of the region together. It sent volunteers to assist in the war against
the Soviet Union.
Jemaah Islamiyah is an organisation committed to regional issues. It sees itself as the successor to Darul Islam. It has an organisation similar to Al-Qaeda. It operates with cell groups at grass roots. It also has educational, social, healthcare and military strands to its structure. It was formally established in 1994 or 1995.
The leadership consists of Abdullah Sungkat (now deceased) Omar
al-Faruq (now in United States custody) and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who has spent
some months in police detention and is to stand trial for treason.[63]
The chair of the Jemaah Islamiyah Regional Advisory Council is Ridman
Isamuddin, otherwise known as Hanbali. He is still a fugitive.
There are a number of Jemaah Islamiyah cells in the Philippines
although the main operative Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi is in prison. The number of
cells existing in Singapore have been dramatically reduced through Government
vigilance. However it is through Jemaah Islamiah Malaysia that links were
established with Al-Qaeda and Mohammed Atta involved in September 11 had
connections with JI Malaysia. The Indonesian JI network is closely connected
with the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, the MMI. The latter was formed in
Yogyakarta in 2000 and Ba’asyr is its emir or leader. The MMI provides an
umbrella for about one hundred smaller Muslim activist groups. Overtly the MMI
has a leadership and spiritual function but it is believed to provide channels
for the movement of foreign currency through out the net work. It also recruits
for the regional net work. It is known to have active contacts with Al Qaeda
and has facilitated visits from senior members to Indonesia. It is also known
to have contacts in Australia. The Bali bombing group has allegedly links to
the JI network.
The origins of JI Indonesia can be traced back to the 1960s or even
earlier. Ba’asyir established a radio station in the 1960s where he was able to
advocate the imposition of the sharia law in Indonesia. The Soeharto government
closed the station down. In 1972 he and Abdullah Sungkar founded a boarding
school, a pesantren or pondok in a village called Pondok Ngruki near Solo in
central Java.[64]It was
called Al Mukim. It began with thirteen students and thirty years later has
around two thousand. The Islam taught at this pesantren is a version of Saudi
Arabian Wahhabism; the most conservative strand in modern day Sunni Islam.[65]
Since the arrest of Amrozi a prime subject in the bali bombing another
school has come to light. This boarding school was founded by a graduate of Al
Munkim, Ustadz Zakavin. This school is located in the village of Hamogan and is
in East Java. The founder has links to JI and the MMI.
The schools nurture three key areas of human development. Firstly, a
deep connection is encouraged between a person’s life and their faith.
Secondly, a strong bond of friendship and kinship is consciously affirmed
between all the students and this in turn creates a firm loyalty to the school,
its traditions, its teachers and its founder. Thirdly, a commitment to
propagate Islam and its ideals in the wider community and to work to reform the
Islamic base of Indonesia. By combining these three influences it is not
surprising that many who identify with this stream of Islam will have no qualms
about loosing their lives-either in a pre-emptive jihad or in defensive
battles. Any one loosing their lives in the name of God and in carrying out
what they sincerely believe is the will of God for them automatically makes
their sacrifice into the death of a martyr.
The aim of those who belong to Jemaah Islamiyah is basic. They sponsors
the re-working of the 1824 borders for the region by seeking to bring together
into a federation the Muslims of Indonesia with the Muslims of Brunei,
Malaysia, southern Thailand and the southern Philippines. Having launched this
sponsorship and sowed the seeds of the plan in the minds and the hearts of
Muslims in the region they will patiently wait for the opportunity to bring the
federation to fruition. The plan involves neither detail nor an exact
timetable. It is put forward as a vision for the future and as an ideal to be pursued,
if necessary by force when the time is apposite, in order to right the wrongs
of western colonialism and to give back to the Muslims of South East Asia their
heritage.
This plan made the JI network of South East Asia particularly
attractive to Al Qaeda which has a similar vision for the Arab states of the
Middle East and the surrounding areas of central Asia and Africa. It is not
surprising that the two movements are part of a total reform package for the
Muslim world.
Activist movements like Jemaah Islamiah are not necessarily radical in
the context of modern day Islam in South East Asia. They are revitalisation
movements within Islam. What has radicalised movements like this both inside
and outside the region is their increasingly anti-western stance.
Within the Muslim world they are not considered radical. Indeed Osama
bin Laden and Abdubakar Ba’asyir are celebrity figures, icons who symbolise a
new initiative to unit Muslims and who challenge the influence of the west
within the Islamic world.
The casualties of September 11 and October 12 are small compared to the
numbers who have been killed in conflicts within Indonesia and other parts of
the Muslim world and in particular in comparison to the numbers of Muslims
killed in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. On the other hand
it is difficult for people who have lived with violence in Indonesia over
recent years to appreciate how Australians feel about the numbers of their
citizens killed in the incident. This is particularly the case when they recall
Australia’s support for the invasion of East Timor and the way in which
Australia turned a blind eye to the extraordinary way in which Indonesians
treated the East Timorese.
Nine eleven can be interpreted as an incident primarily addressed to
the United States administration. On this basis 10/12 is an incident addressed
to the Australian Government. Both incidents have wider connotations for the
Western world.
October 12 came at the beginning of the tourist season that lasts four
to five months and which is dominated by Australians escaping the heat and
enjoying the holiday festive season. Both the United States and Australia stand
for the western world and the way it is perceived to exploit the developing
world for its own economic and political advantage. It is these perceptions
that drive the level of activism: for people who know and experience violence
in their lives and who believe that their turmoil is exploited by the west, the
cost to us has been minimal.
Given the history of violence in Indonesia and given the legitimation
of violence by religion and the suppression of freedoms by the Soeharto
Government which was supported in every way by the west it is not surprising
that the bombing in Bali occurred.
But what was unknown until the bombing occurred was the extent of the
influence of the JI movement and of the support it has received within
Indonesia since the end of the Soeharto Government from Laskar Jihad and Laskar
Jundullah and the connections between these movements and Al Qaeda. The details
are as yet unclear and in fact the details of the connections may for reasons
of sensitivity remain unclear for some time even years. What is known and what
has caused the surprise is the depth these movements have penetrated into the
psyche of Muslims. This penetration coincides with the revitalisation of Islam
and of its political and economic intention world wide.
It has been widely thought that the Islam of South East Asia is benign
compared to Islam elsewhere.[66]
This is an exaggeration.
The Islams of South East Asia are different from the Islams in other
parts of the world. Culture, ethnicity, history and geography ensure that these
differences exist.
But Islam is a religious faith to be lived politically as well as
economically wherever it is practised in the world. Islam has as a result
different visions of what the ideal world should be like and there are
different political agendas as to how that ideal world can be realised. [67]
There is a jihad of the soul and the inner life-a struggle to realise
the spiritual agenda of submission to
Allah in all aspects of life. This is the corner stone to being a Muslim.
Pilgrimage to Makkah and keeping the fast month of Ramadan nurture this
spiritual agenda. But there is also a jihad that is both defensive and
offensive. Whenever the Muslim is threatened the response is to assert identity
and to proclaim the oneness and uniqueness of God with renewed conviction. This
sometimes means an armed struggle against an oppressor.
The stirrings within Indonesia led by assertive internal movements and
the regional movements that seek to unite Muslims across old colonial borders
to a new definition of identity are expressions of both internal and external
jihad. But outsiders need to recognise that he way in which jihad is worked out
in Indonesia is complex.
Since Soeharto stood down as President Indonesia has begun to travel
through a period of transition.[68]
What outcomes there might be is very unclear at the present time: inevitably
the past is always much clearer than the future.
But what the outsider can see happening in Indonesia is part of an
awakening within Islam world- wide. So far as we can tell that awakening is
leading to clashes with the Western world and not to a resolution of the
fundamental inequalities that divide the world on economic and political
grounds.[69]
But there is another observation that is important and it arises
directly from this analysis.
Religion empowers and
legitimises violence and because of its promises it sweetens death both for the
perpetrator of violence and its victim.[70]
The offer of eternal life lessens human injustice and the cruelty of the
struggle and excuses and justifies the perpetrator’s actions. The idea that
human actions and behaviour will be subject to divine assessment at the end of
a person’s life refers injustice to the realm of the divine for resolution. It
also enables the powerless to walk on water and to rise in revolution. It is
surprising how much is still said and done in the name of God in the Middle
East and in the West.[71]
The novelist Tom Clancey who has also written non- fiction works about
various units within the United Sates Military, has created this piece of
dialogue in a recent novel.
Liz one of the main characters says to her companion:
There are events in history that trigger what we call ‘mass movements’. Examples are the American Revolution, the Communist Revolution, the French Resistance during the Second World War. Even the Renaissance, though that was less clearly defined. It’s the result of a collection of people whose imaginations are stirred to action by a person, or an event, or even an idea.
Stowes Uncle Tom’s Cabin,
Hood said
That or Upton Sinclair’s The
Jungle, Liz agreed. You get an emancipation movement or a sweeping overhaul in
the meat industry. Incited by one thing or another, people come together for
the common good, their collective efforts producing seemingly impossible
results.
The whole is greater than
the
sum of the parts, Hood said.
Exactly, Liz replied. I think we are looking at something that is being positioned very much like that.[72]
And I would add to that dialogue the following words-But the problem is we do not have control of
the agenda. Other forces that originate from elsewhere are driving it.
In recent years we have not taken the trouble to understand Indonesia
and its Islam. Religion has become a personal matter or a matter of individual
choice for those of us who live in the Western world, especially since the
1960s but it was a notion that was creeping up on us for much of the twentieth
century. We have thought that others were just as affected by this process as
we have been. We have thought that Islam like Christianity would die exposed to
the secularising force of Globalisation.[73]
In such circumstances there has been no pressure for us to learn about and to
understand Islam. We have not noticed that it has become the fastest growing
religion in the modern world and that Muslims have been spreading through out
the world to live.
We have thought that we can exploit the resources we need to support
our industrial economy, and that others will continue to willingly supply these
on our terms.
To save money we have relied on surveillance technologies instead of human
intelligence to really know what others are planning.
We have thought that the techniques and advanced weaponry of third
generation warfare were sufficient to enable the west to keep control of
crucial trade roots and the oil sources of our energy needs. This mindset has
remained in place in spite of the defeat of the United Sates in Vietnam where
fourth generation methods proved so formidable. Yet nine eleven and ten twelve
resulted from fourth generation initiatives, and have proved to be effective
ways of traumatising the morale and the economies of the United States and the
West. The United States response has been to use third generation weapons and
methods in an attempt to regain power and influence: but such a response has
the affect of forcing opponents underground. It will take the west time, years
in fact, to develop the strategies of fourth generation warfare and the
intelligence methods and community to go with it. Time in the war against
terrorism is a very uncertain period.
It is probably too early to tell if nine eleven and ten twelve are the
triggers for a mass movement as suggested in the novel, but the two events do
appear to be an integral part of an orchestrated programme that will continue
to unfold according to someone else’s agenda. Where this programme and the
western world’s response will lead is for the present unclear.
But the possibility exists that these two events are triggers for the
start of something bigger. This ‘something bigger’ need not be something that
others do to us but maybe something we do that is, on our part, a calculated
response to what happens to us-however we may legitimise our action. This is
worth considering even if we at this point in time are powerless to prevent the
flow of events.
On the other hand the crisis may pass without the situation escalating.
But so long as the Israel Palestine problem continues and so long as the United
States and Iranian relationship continues unresolved, passions will simmer
throughout the Muslim world giving rise to ‘terrorist’ incidents that will
affect the west and its political and economic stability.
For those who disagree with events like nine eleven and twelve ten and
what they symbolise for the perpetrators there are four responses.
Firstly to declare such events acts of terrorism.
Secondly to use such a declaration to declare war on terrorism wherever
it may be found and to meet such force with a greater force as was the case
with the destruction of the Taliban in Afghanistan.[74].
Thirdly to use all possible means to capture and to bring into the
western legal process as many of the leaders of these designated movements as
can be identified and found.
Fourthly to engage in discussion Muslim scholars and leaders of Muslim
communities in parts of the Islamic world where relationships with the western
world are delicately balanced and are sensitive issues. In other words, to seek
through positive engagement to win over the hearts and minds of Muslims greatly
reducing in the process the possibility of a major clash between the Western
world and the Islamic world. The aim is to encourage Muslim scholars to adopt
western standards of historical criticism and to apply these to their own
understanding of Islam and by so doing to put Islam on the same intellectual footing
as Christianity.
The fourth option is long term. The other three are far more immediate.
Within the Muslim world the struggle is of a different kind.
It is connected with the elimination of poverty (in which it is
believed the western world because of its greater economic power has a crucial
responsibility) and in the forging of an equal partnership with western
countries in the exploitation and use of non-renewable resources (such as oil).
It lies in the recognition that Islam should have the freedom to exist
and to thrive in its all its religious variety with its different political and
economic systems, and as another grouping of civilisations alongside western
alternatives, without being judged as inferior and threatening by the latter.
In this connection Muslims seek the freedom to propagate Islam as a
complete belief system intellectually and religiously in the west, and to have
the same opportunity to win the hearts and souls of western people that
Christianity had in western colonial empires.
This freedom to propagate is very different from the freedom to choose
or not to choose a religion as a matter of personal preference. There are two
sides to the winning of hearts and souls.
To quote once more from a character in the Clancy novel: Faith can never be defeated by threats and
force of arms. It has to be defeated by a better idea.[75]But
in the circumstances of the war on terrorism it is an open question as to
whether Islam will prevail or a rejuvenated Christianity and church can prevail.
What is significant is that the West and the Muslim world are going
along different paths. That is the tragedy of the modern world. And this is
what has led us in the West into a war against terrorism and into a conflict in
the Middle East without appreciating the depth of the misunderstanding and the
wide gulf that separates us on almost all levels of human contact and
interaction.
The choices we make as our response to events like nine eleven and ten
twelve will always be difficult and be limited by electoral and economic
pressures that determine the contours of much of our western decision making.
It will also be limited by our ignorance of the Muslim world. Because the
military power and the economic strength lies in the United States and Europe it
is difficult for us to take the long road and engage intellectually with Islam
and the Muslim world. As decisions on these issues are made elsewhere all we
can do in New Zealand is to await developments and to decide when the time
arrives where we fit into that response.
[1] This is a working paper. It will be subject to revision and further development in the light of continuing research. Please do not cite without the author’s permission. Jim.Veitch@vuw.ac.nz
[2] This text incorporates most of a public lecture delivered to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs-the Wellington Branch, on 19 November 2002. Additions have been made to bring the story up to date as at the end of January 2003.Footnotes have also been added to include reference to the literature that lies behind the text.
[3] This lecture is the second of two on Indonesia I gave in 2002.The first was entitled Islam and Christianity in Indonesia: A fifty year search for Understanding, Tolerance and Respect and was presented to a symposium on Islam and Globalization in Indonesia. The symposium was organised jointly by the New Zealand Asia Institute at the University of Auckland and the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, on 19 March 2002 and published by the Institute in its Working Paper Series, October 2002.Readers of the text of this lecture are encouraged to read this working paper.
[4] See Jakarta Post, 8 October 1996. My graduate student Andrew Renton-Green who is working on Indonesia read this script and offered some useful details that I have incorporated. I am appreciative of his assistance and of his knowledge of Indonesia.
[5] The tale has been told brilliantly by Giles Milton in his book Nathaniel’s Nutmeg: How One man’s Courage Changed the Course of History. London. 1999. How the Dutch must have regretted exchanging a now useless spice island for Manhattan. That was one major consequence of the intense rivalry of the time.
[6] The Japanese occupation was also very significant. Much of the administrative structure the Japanese put in place has remained.
[7] For an anthropological account of Aceh see, James Siegel The Rope of God (1969) Though dated this is a very useful introduction to the people of Aceh.
[8] There is also a significant Chinese influence both ancient and modern
[9] I lived with my family in Makassar from early in 1970 until mid 1975 and became very interested in the history and culture of the Makassarese, the Buginese and of the Christian Torajanese. While we lived in the city the boundaries were altered and the name of the city changed to Ujung Pandang. It was said that this was to give the city a new and fresh identity. Makassar is linked to maha-kasar a word meaning ‘very coarse or rude, ill-bred’. Ujung Pandang by contrast means the view from the end (of the island)-something beautiful like the stunning sunsets that can be viewed from the waterfront every evening. The change was understandable though the character of the Makassarese had changed over time. Recently the name has changed back to Makassar. When we visited in August 2002 none of our friends appeared to know the reason for the name change. There is still confusion with travel agents many of whom have yet to make the change and even within Indonesia the two names stand side by side.
[10] See the excellent study on these people by Christian Pelras. The Bugis 1996
[11] Kanti P.Bajpai has written about violence in independent India in Roots of Violence (2002). His study begins It is ironic that liberal democratic India has been the stage of immense violence. The promise of liberal democracy, after all, is that extreme violent actions, whether by governments or other members of society, will be avoided. (p 1)The practical challenge for concerned citizens and not just the government is to find ways to de-legitimise violence and not support it in any way. (p178)The issue of violence is not only an Indonesian problem but is widespread throughout the world. The problem for Indonesia is to find ways of defusing the extent and the endemic depth of the violence within its territory both at the level of government and of people.
[12] Freek Colombijn and J.Thomas Lindblad Roots of Violence in Indonesia. Leiden 2002 p1 and p24
[13] A useful and recent history of Indonesia is Robert Cribb and Colin Brown. Modern Indonesia: A History Since 1945 (1995)
[14] Geoff Forrester & R.J.May (eds) The Fall of Soeharto 1998.See in particular Forrester’s diary of the events surrounding the fall of Soeharto pp24-69 and the chronology of events leading up to the fall of Soeharto by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti in the same volume p239-245. Soeharto’s resignation speech is on pages 246and 247.
[15] V.S.Naipul in Beyond Belief (1998) has an interesting dialogue with Wahid p21ff. The other reports about Islam in Indonesian life in Part One is also revealing. Indeed the book is a very valuable perspective on the Muslim world in Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan and Malaysia.
[16] Parida Abd. Samad has written an interesting analytic study of Gus Dur as he is popularly known. See Gus Dur. A Peculiar Leader in Indonesia’s Political Agony 2001.
[17] Megawati is the daughter of former President Surkano
[18] See also Andrew Renton-Green, Is there Any Need for a New Forum? Reni Winata Identifying Challenges and Opportunities in the (South)West Pacific Region (2002) pp157-167
[19] G.Coedes. The Indianized States of South East Asia. Honolulu (1947/1963) 1968
[20] Clifford Geertz has described the transformation of culture in his valuable study entitled The Religion of Java (1960). He traces the eventual emergence of a Javanese mysticism that holds in tension the interaction between the divine and the human in an overlay of Indian religious belief and culture. He later documented the linkages between the unique religion of Java with the foundation and development of Hindu Bali.
[21] See the authoritative study by Beryl De Zoete and Walter Spies. Dance and Drama in Bali Kuala Lumpur (1938/1952) 1973
[22] Catholic Christianity is called Agama Katolic (the catholic Religion) whereas Protestant Christianity is called Agama Kristian (the Christian Religion)
[23] Catholic Christianity regarded as a religion that was different from Protestant Christianity did not repudiate the primal world to the same degree. But in spite of this it did not find favour with Indonesians largely because of its perceived and real links with the Western world.
[24] Whilst on vacation in Bali in the 1970s and living in Ubud I became friends with an artist who had become a Christian. I had read about his paintings before visiting Bali and was keen to see how he depicted scenes from the Bible. He was the only person in his family and village to become Christian (though his wife and his children as was the accepted custom then as now also became Christian). He told me that on becoming a Christian he had lost his status in the kampong (village) and was no longer expected (and therefore permitted) to sit with family leaders (the men) in the village forum or council. Other subtle pressures made it clear that he was regarded as an outsider. He was, as a result, on the verge of shifting out of the village into the protection of the less insulated and larger environment of Denpasar. (Ubud at the time had a central market and was made up of a number of small settlements or kampongs-each with their own administration and temple complex. The situation may be different now for Ubud is a cosmopolitan town and has adjusted to westernization.)
[25] This was the case in Ambon and Menado, in North Sulawesi, in the Batak region of north Sumatra and to a lesser extent in central Sulawesi, Halmahera in the Molaccas,West Papua, and the islands of Sumba, Flores and East Timor.
[26] The exception is the Chinese communities that have a notable involvement with Christianity.
[27] Christianity was seen to support and to provide the justification for such polices.
[28] This modus operandi deliberately broke the power of chiefs and hereditary leaders and sought to re-arrange the social structure of local (tribal based) communities. In so doing it sought to remove power from the hands of the elite and put it into the hands of those who were educated and trained for the position. Of course while the Dutch ruled Christianity and the Church who were the sponsors and guardians of education authenticated such policies
[29] Like the British in other places, along with the French, the Germans and the Russians the Spanish and the Portuguese. To a large extent the colonial movement coincided with the age of reason that gradually transformed the prevailing and dominating influence of Christianity in Europe as industrialisation and new forms communications, transport and economy took over. In time reason sidelined Christianity and the Church and undermined its foundations as the dominant world-view.
[30] See the interesting chapter by Elisbeth Locher-Scholten (State violence and the police in colonial Indonesia circa 1920-Exploration of a theme, Roots of Violence in Indonesia op cit. The quotation is on p81. This is a very severe judgement and if it can continue to be substantiated through further research is an indictment on the methods of western colonisation.
[31] See the chapter entitled A genealogy of violence by Henk Schulte-Nordholt in Roots of Violence op.cit The quotation is found on p43
[32] There were two coups-the Untung coup known as the 30 of September Movement (G-30-S) and the Soeharto counter-coup. The first was linked to by the latter to the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party.
[33] How many actually died is a matter of considerable debate. The detail can be found in Robert Cribb, The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966 pp11-14 and especially the table on p 12 and note 28 on p13.
[34] Ibid p44
[35] Geoffrey Robinson. The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali. 1995 p273
[36] This is the interpretation given to me by a community leader with whom I spoke in 1972.
[37] ibid. In comparable terms these loses are higher than those suffered in Cambodia under Pol Pot ibid
[38] The community leader (referred to above)with whom I spoke in 1972 described for me the scenes that he witnessed. He spoke of blood flowing in the storm water drains on the side of some streets and of the heart rending cries of those who lost loved ones in the tragedy. Many of these extra-judicial killings were carried out by Muslim gangs directed by the Indonesian military
[39] Cribb op.cit p45ff
[40] Was it a successful counter to an unsuccessful communist take over of Indonesia? Or was it a pre-emptive strike by Soeharto and his associates against the communists as a justification of winning power and of deposing Sukarno-whose time in office had come to an end in the eyes of the military and whose left wing leanings were well known?
[41] To enable it to do so it participates in all those things that Soeharto and his government perpetuated
[42] The Australian policy was dubbed batik diplomacy and was formulated by the Whitlam government in 1974 and largely followed by Whitlam’s successors. The diplomacy aimed at creating a close relationship between Indonesia and Australia. After talks in September 1974 between Whitlam and Soeharto the Australian Prime Minister said he favoured the integration of East Timor into Indonesia following an internationally accepted act of determination. In April 1975 following a further meeting between the two leaders the Australian PM said that integration was inevitable and the best outcome. Mark Aarons and Robert Domm East Timor: A Western Made Tragedy 1992 p17. See also the account of the influence of Ambassador Woolcott in the further development of the Whitlam pragmatic policy in spite of hesitations to the contrary within the Defence Department. ibid.pp18-24
[43] See for example the account in Sonny Inbaraj East Timor: Blood and Tears in Asean (1995)
[44] Aarons and Domm op cit p 27-28. The visit took place against the backdrop of the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. The Soeharto and Indonesian view that an independent East Timor with communist sympathies if not policies would be totally unacceptable met with the approval of the US President.
[45] Aarons and Domm ibid p32. Amnsety International put the figure even higher.
[46] See Aarons and Domm op.cit appendix 1 for a comment on the legality of the Timor Gap Treaty
[47] For an account of this event see Inbaraj op cit p87-127 and Aarons and Domm p64ff
[48] For an estimate of Habibie’s Presidency see the contribution of Dewi Fortuna Anwar in Geoff Forrester (ed) Post Soeharto Indoneisa: Renewal or Chaos?1999p p 33-47.
[49] Centralist means a political party that recognises the role played by people of other faiths in nation building and therefore does not see Indonesia becoming a Muslim state where the shariah (Muslim law) is applied to all of its citizens.
[50] See the contribution of Amien Rais (chairman of Partai Amanat Nasional) Islam and Politics in Contemporary Indonesia, Geoff Forrester, Post-Soeharto Indonesia op cit pp198-202
[51] For an historical account of these events and subsequent developments set in the wider history of Iran see Sandra Mackey The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation. 1996 p271ff
[52] See for example publications in Indonesian as follows.Zia Permata Buana (ed) Hanya Satu Kata: Jihad-Melacak Jejak Osama bin Laden dan Jaringannya (2001);Ready Susanto Osama Bin Laden Jihad Sepanjang Hayat (2001);M. Jamiluddin Ritonga and Bien Pasaribu Perang Bush Memburu Osama (2001); Wahyu D.Johani (ed) Syekh Guevara Bin Laden: Sang Pemberontak Revolusioner (2002) One does need a knowledge of Indonesian to realise that the interest in Osama bin Laden is high.
[53] The present day social and political position of the church in some countries of Scandinavia and of Europe as well as of England is a remnant of s similar position that once pertained for centuries in the West with Christianity
[54] The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1997)
[55] If the Muslim world is expanding as fast as Huntingdon and others indicate it will overtake Christianity as the preferred religion of the peoples of the world in less than twenty five years time. As Christianity begins to decline from its current 33 % of the world’s population to about 25% during this period Islam will rise from its current status of just over 20-25% to more than 30%. The psychological impact on the ‘Christian’ West’ of this changeover in status, where Christianity has always been seen as the religion for all people will become obvious. If the West is to avoid this situation occurring then it must find ways of restraining the Muslim world. As this scenario is played out the tensions will rise and conflicts will occur where either or both sides feel threatened. Some of these conflicts will be major given the nature of the weapons at each side’s disposal. The alternative to the West’s overwhelming military superiority (demonstrated in Afghanistan and perhaps soon to be demonstrated in Iraq) is the development of fourth generation patterns of conflict-the kind of response currently labelled terrorism in the west and symbolised by eleven twelve and twelve ten.
[56] See two very significant publications in Indonesian. Tim Peneliti Gerakan Islam Radikal Kontemporer Di Indonesia:Front Pembela Islam (FPI) dan Laskar Jihad (FKAWJ) Jakarta 2001 and Pdt Ahmen Mylthis Lumira Islam dan Anti Kekerasan Yogyakarta 2001
[57] On April 26 in a packed mosque in Ambon Thalib called for war against Christians. His speech included the following phrases. With this we declare that from today (26 April) Maluku is officially declared a war zone…Prepare an army of war… Prepare weapons, use what you have to make bombs, spend your money to ready your weapons…From this day on there will be no more talk of being good to one another…From this day on,what will be is talk about which districts we have succeeded in occupying. From this day the talk will be about how many bombs you have made. Indonesia News 05/21/02
[58] See two detailed articles on the affect of the conflict on women and the family in Jurnal Perempuan no 24 2002 pp 35-47 and pp 49-62. The articles centre on Poso in the central Sulawesi region.
[59] See the very valuable report published by the international crisis group (ICG) Brussels. Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates Asia Report no 43 Jakarta/Brussels 11 Dcecember 2002.
[60] The most informative and detailed study to date on this subject is
Zachary Abuza, Tentacles of Terror: Al
Qaeda’s South East Asia Network in his soon to be published study entitled Terrorism and Radical Islam in South East
Asia.
[61] Guardian Saturday January 18 2003
[62] Prior to the Bali bombing Laskar Jihad disbanded its para military wing (with a promise to reactivate it should the internal situation warrant it) but remains active in education, health care, and in promoting the renewal of Islamic faith throughout Indonesia. It is still a force to be reckoned with.
[63] Some of the more important addreses given by Ba’asyir have been prepared for publication by Fauzan Al-Anshari with the title Saya Terroris? (2002).
[64] The pesantren as an educational institution plays a major role in the nurturing of the Islamic faith in the lives of the students. The institution aims to give students an increased sense of Muslim identity and instil a greater commitment to the faith. The students are very loyal to their teachers and committed to Islam. The schools are usually founded and run by charismatic religious figures and cover primary as well as secondary education.
[65] See the excellent study by Sandra Mackey The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom (original edition 1987 most recent with new introduction and updated bibliography 2002)
[66] See for example Douglas E.Ramage Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (1995)
[67] A very useful study is Reinhard Schulze A modern History of the Islamic World 2000. John Esposito has summarised Islam in What Everyone Needs to Know a About Islam (2002). An invaluable set of the most important pieces of literature has been compiled for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore by Ahmad Ibrahim,Sharon Siddique and Yasmin Hussain Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia 1985.reprint 1990
[68] See such studies as Adam Schwarz A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (1994)
[69] John Esposito Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (2002). Another interesting and valuable study is Tariq Ali The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity (2002) The list of reading would be incomplete without Bernard Lewis What went Wrong? Western impact and Middle Eastern Responses (2002)
[70] And this is strange because religion was created to transfom the spiral of violence and to act as a civilising agent. See Dudley Young, Origins of the Sacred: The Ecstacies of Love and War. (1991)
[71] US Presidents invoke the name of God at the end of addresses. President Bush’s addresses are peppered with biblical and religious language. Muslims talk of the US as the big Satan. It seems we cannot escape the language of religion when we clash with each other and invoke the prospect of war. Conflict must be justified on religious terms.
[72] Mission of Honor. Created by Tom Clancy and Steve Pieczenik and written by Jeff Rovin.2002 p200
[73] see Johan Meuleman Islam in the Era of Globalization (2002)
[74] Although not linked to war against world terrorism the possible war against Iraq will be interpreted by the leaders of terrorist movements who have been labelled as such in the west as another step in the reaction to the events in New York and in Bali
[75] Mission of Honor. opcit.p 207